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GETTING TO “LET’S TALK”: LEGAL AND
NATURAL DESTABILIZATIONS AND
THE FUTURE OF
REGIONAL COLLABORATION
Bradley C. Karkkainen*
In a provocative 2004 law review article,1 Chuck Sabel and Bill Simon
advanced the thesis that public law litigation is moving away from the model of
“command-and-control” style judicial intervention, toward what they call a
“destabilization rights” approach.2 From the 1960s forward, Sabel and Simon
argue, crusading lawyers in civil rights, civil liberties, and other public law
litigation cases succeeded (at least sometimes) in persuading courts to step in
with structural injunctions, ordering sweeping overhauls of schools, prisons,
police departments, public welfare agencies, and other institutions that were
found to be in violation of constitutional or important statutory norms. But
over time, both plaintiffs and interventionist judges came to realize that the
highly prescriptive remedies that came out of these cases did not always work
very well. Crafted by judges lacking expertise in the necessary subject matter,
some remedies were overinclusive while others were underinclusive. Often the
remedies themselves proved rigid, inflexible, inefficient, and ineffective in
achieving their intended ends. Sometimes they hobbled the affected agencies’
ability to carry out their core missions. Sometimes they devolved into mere
formalities, court-erected procedural obstacles to be circumvented by crafty
bureaucrats. In short, able judges proved to be clumsy social engineers and
inept agency CEOs, in over their heads in attempting to refashion public
institutions.3
More recently, Sabel and Simon argue, judges in public law litigation
cases have attempted to manage with a defter touch. Employing what Sabel
and Simon call a “destabilization rights” approach, judges do not presume to
prescribe in detail the precise changes that must be made in failing institutions.
Instead, their response is to blow the whistle on the constitutional or statutory
violation, pull the plug on—or “destabilize”—the offending institution, and
then in effect remand the matter to the state to reform or reconfigure the institution in ways that cure the violation.4 Meanwhile, however, the court retains
* Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law School.
1 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
2 Id. at 1019-20. The term “destabilization rights” was coined by Roberto Unger. See
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY
IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987).
3 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 1052-53.
4 Id. at 1055-56.

811

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ302.txt

812

unknown

Seq: 2

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

8-AUG-08

10:59

[Vol. 8:811

jurisdiction over the matter, to allow it to determine down the road whether the
government’s self-devised institutional reform or reconfiguration is adequate to
cure the constitutional or statutory defect.
This remedy, Sabel and Simon argue, puts pressure on the state as the
defendant to go back and devise novel and often surprisingly creative new institutional reforms, typically in consultation and collaboration with the plaintiffs
to the original suit.5 The state—now in partnership with the very parties who
were aggrieved by the constitutional or statutory offense—is much better positioned than an inexpert court to devise creative and effective solutions that both
cure the constitutional or statutory wrong, and yet serve the institution’s underlying mission effectively and efficiently.
In the Sabel-Simon model, potential plaintiffs in public law litigation
cases are said to hold a “destabilization right”—the right to go to court to
secure an order to destabilize an institution that is in serious violation of an
important constitutional or statutory norm, and force the state to go back to the
drawing board and design a new institution to take its place.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the “destabilization rights” model has many
applications in environmental and natural resources law.6 Part I of this Paper
recounts several examples.
Part II advances the thesis that legal destabilization rights are not the only
destabilizing forces that drive the development of environmental and natural
resources law. Equally important are natural and anthropogenic “destabilization events”—disasters and crises of such severity that they force destabilization of existing legal and institutional arrangements, and compel parties to go
back to the drawing board to draw up new assignments of rights, duties, and
institutional arrangements.
Part III argues that a combination of legal destabilization rights and natural (or perhaps better, part natural and part anthropogenic (or “anthropo-natural,” as I shall call them)) destabilization events are conspiring to overturn
established legal and institutional arrangements on the Colorado River. The
coming destabilization, I venture to predict, will provoke fierce and sometimes
cutthroat competition, but also a new round of collaboration. Indeed, I would
argue that when it comes to prospects for collaboration on the Colorado, the
question is not “Whether,” but “When?” The answer, I suspect, is not until
legal and natural (or “anthropo-natural”) events bring the situation to the brink
of disaster, and a major destabilization moment occurs. At that point all bets
are off, and bargaining from the ground up must begin anew.

5 Id. at 1073-80 (stating that the legal destabilization opens the door to collaboration
because, inter alia, it increases uncertainty within the defendant institution, reverses the usual
presumption in favor of the status quo, forces deliberative reason-giving, increases public
scrutiny, and legitimizes and empowers stakeholders).
6 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006).
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The Sabel-Simon destabilization rights thesis was developed in the context
of public law litigation—primarily civil rights and civil liberties cases involving either constitutional or statutory causes of action, or similar kinds of cases
brought under state constitutional provisions guaranteeing educational “adequacy” or “efficiency.”7
The specific causes of action Sabel and Simon discuss are rare in the environmental and natural resources law context. Important parallels to Sabel and
Simon-type destabilization rights can be found, however, in both common law
and statutory contexts in environmental and natural resources law.
Perhaps the clearest example is the California Supreme Court’s application of a broad Saxian version of the public trust doctrine in the Mono Lake
case.8 In a pioneering contribution to environmental and natural resources law
in 1970, Professor Joseph Sax argued for updating and expanding the traditional common law public trust doctrine,9 which held that the sovereign holds
title to the lands beneath the tidal waters in trust for the public generally, for
use in navigation, commerce, and fishing.10
American courts had already stretched this traditional doctrine somewhat,
most importantly in the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.11
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the non-tidal, freshwater Great Lakes
were subject to the public trust12 and that the State of Illinois’s public trust
obligation was sufficiently robust to justify the State’s unilateral rescission,
without compensation, of a grant of the submerged lands beneath Chicago Harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad, which had been effected through an earlier
act of the state legislature.13
7 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 1022-52 (citing examples of public law litigation in
the areas of school reform, mental health services, prisons, police abuse, and housing).
8 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
9 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
10 See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351,
351-52 (1998); see also, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (“In England, from
the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that the title in the soil of the sea, or of
arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the King, except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant, or by prescription or usage and
that this title, jus privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the public
right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.”) (citations omitted)).
11 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
12 Id. at 435 (stating that the “same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands
covered by fresh water in the Great Lakes,” which “possess all the general characteristics of
open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of
the tide”).
13 Id. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be
held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation” because “[t]he State can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can
abdicate its police powers.”).
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In a highly influential 1970 law review article,14 Professor Sax argued that
the public trust doctrine should be further expanded and updated by extending
the public trust “corpus”—the property subject to the trust—to include all manner of common pool environmental and natural resources, such as clean air,
water (whether navigable or non-navigable), wildlife, scenic views, and so on.
Sax further urged expanding the list of judicially cognizable public trust purposes beyond the traditional categories of navigation, commerce, and fishing to
include environmental benefits like public health, recreation, ecological, and
aesthetic benefits.15 This move, Sax argued, would establish in the public generally a cause of action against the sovereign for failing to protect these public
trust resources adequately, thus laying the groundwork for a common law of
the environment.16
Although Sax’s creative proposal stirred a great deal of subsequent academic commentary and debate, it has generally been less influential in the
courts of most jurisdictions.17 But there have been a few important exceptions,
including California.
The Mono Lake case18 is the paradigmatic example of a judicial application of the Saxian vision of an expanded and up-to-date public trust doctrine.
In that case, the National Audubon Society sought to enjoin Los Angeles’s plan
to increase its water diversions from freshwater tributaries of Mono Lake, a
saline lake on the eastside of the Sierra Nevada east of Yosemite, over which
Los Angeles had long held appropriative water rights recognized by the state
Board of Water Resources. The California Supreme Court held that as a navigable body of water, Mono Lake was subject to the public trust doctrine,19
which in previous cases the court had extended to include environmental purposes such as fish, shellfish, and wildlife habitat, as well as recreational and
aesthetic benefits.20 To the extent diversions from Mono Lake’s non-navigable
14

Sax, supra note 9.
Id. at 556-57 (arguing that “the principle of the public trust is broader than its traditional
application indicates” and could be extended to “controversies involving air pollution, the
dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and strip mining or
wetland filling”).
16 Id. at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine
seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to
resource management problems” insofar as it meets three essential criteria: it “contain[s]
some concept of a legal right in the general public,” is “enforceable against the government,”
and is “capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for environmental quality.”) (footnote omitted)).
17 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 691 (1986) (stating that “the apparent litigation achievements of the public trust doctrine dim considerably, if
not diminish altogether, when studied in light of independent developments in more generally applicable areas of the law, such as standing, nuisance, the police power, and administrative law,” which collectively marginalize the public trust doctrine’s role).
18 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
19 Id. at 720 (“Mono Lake is . . . a navigable waterway” and consequently the “beds, shores
and waters of the lake are without question protected by the public trust.”).
20 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the state’s
public trust in tidelands extends to “preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
15
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tributaries impaired this public trust resource, the court reasoned, they too were
subject to public trust limitations.21
But the Mono Lake court refused to impose specific limits on Los Angeles’s water diversions.22 Instead, it remanded the question to the California
Water Resources Board with instructions to reconsider Los Angeles’s water
rights in light of the State’s ongoing public trust obligation, which the court
said had not received adequate consideration in earlier Water Board proceedings.23 The courts, however, retained jurisdiction to oversee subsequent
developments.24
The Mono Lake case, then, has the posture of a pure “destabilization
rights” play: the court refrained from a “command-and-control”-style judicial
intervention, but it did destabilize existing legal and institutional arrangements,
namely Los Angeles’s appropriative water right, which had been thought well
settled under longstanding water law doctrines, but which the court declared to
be incompatible with equally important public trust norms. Just as in the SabelSimon model, the destabilization appears to have worked to foster ongoing collaboration between the State, the City of Los Angeles, and the original plaintiffs, as well as other interested parties. Although the process was not without
friction, the ultimate outcome was the emergence of a rough kind of collaborative “new governance” arrangement under which Los Angeles is entitled to
variable water withdrawals compatible with current hydrological and ecological
conditions in Mono Lake, as negotiated through an ongoing collaborative process involving the other parties, including conservation organizations, local
governments, and key state agencies.25 Indeed, this process has worked sufficiently well that some commentators have proposed it as a model for collaborative and adaptive management of water resources in other water basins in the
American West, a region where water is often the critical limiting resource for
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area”).
21 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721 (“We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as
recognized and developed in California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm
caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries.”) (footnote omitted)).
22 Id. at 732 (“We do not dictate any particular allocation of water.”).
23 Id. at 728 (stating that under its ongoing duty to safeguard the public trust, the state “has
the power to reconsider [water] allocation decisions even though those decisions were made
after due consideration of their effect on the public trust,” and is under an even greater
obligation to do so when, as in the present case, “that decision failed to weigh and consider
public trust uses”).
24 Id. at 729-31 (holding that the California courts and the Water Board have concurrent
jurisdiction over challenges to water allocations predicated upon the public trust doctrine).
25 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness
and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 8 HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2001) (stating that in the aftermath of the Mono Lake
litigation, the parties elected to reframe the issue, not as a zero-sum rights-based legal conflict, but as a “multi-faceted problem to be solved cooperatively, or at least by negotiation,”
leading to an arrangement that simultaneously stabilized water supplies and ecological values); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary
Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Arnold, Anniversary Lessons] (describing in greater detail the collaborative problem-solving arrangement that
emerged in the aftermath of the Mono Lake case).
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human subsistence and economic development, as well as for the survival of
non-human species.26
Although not conceived as a “destabilization rights” law, the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”) has also been used at times in a manner compatible with
the Sabel-Simon thesis. Here, two examples will suffice.
The first example comes from Southern California, where rapid urbanization (or suburban sprawl) in San Diego, Orange, and Riverside Counties was
threatening to eliminate the last vestiges of the region’s unique coastal sage
scrub habitat, vital to the survival of a number of species endemic to the area.27
Listing these species as threatened or endangered under the ESA threatened to
bring development in the region to a screeching halt. Hoping to forestall that
development, California adopted a voluntary Natural Communities Conservation Planning (“NCCP”) scheme, hoping to bring together developers, landowners, conservationists, and state and local officials to devise voluntary
regional, landscape-scale plans to steer development into configurations that
would preserve important habitat preserves and corridors.28
By most accounts, however, the voluntary NCCP planning process was
going nowhere until federal Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt proposed listing
the California gnatcatcher, a small songbird indigenous to the sage scrub, under
the Endangered Species Act.29 At that point, all bets were off. Because listing
threatened to destabilize existing local planning and land use regulatory
regimes, landowners, developers, and local officials suddenly had urgent new
incentives to take the NCCP process seriously in hopes of avoiding the heavyhanded hammer of the federal ESA prohibition on “take” of listed species.
They joined together with state and federal conservation officials and local and
national conservation groups to hammer out far-reaching regional NCCP plans,
setting aside large core habitat reserves and wildlife corridors, and setting tough
mandatory development limits, incorporated into local land use codes, in a
“buffer” area surrounding the protected core.30 Developers found that new residential developments in the vicinity of the habitat reserves could command an
aesthetic and environmental premium, substantially offsetting any losses attributable to density limitations and non-development of some lands. In return for
their participation, Interior Secretary Babbitt agreed to subject the California
26

See Arnold, Anniversary Lessons, supra note 25, at 48-55.
Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 696 & n.3 (1997) (noting Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that ninety
percent of the coastal sage scrub habitat had disappeared in a five-county region in Southern
California under pressure from suburban sprawl).
28 See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution
Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 98-99 (2002).
29 See DeAnne Parker, Comment, Natural Community Conservation Planning: California’s Emerging Ecosystem Management Alternative, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 107, 129-30
(1997); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of
the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 335-36 (1998) (noting that most
environmental groups were dissatisfied with the purely voluntary NCCP approach, and some
pursued legal avenues to force ESA listing).
30 Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 28, at 105-09 (describing features of the San Diego
Multiple Species Conservation Program, one of several subregional plans in the Southern
California NCCP).
27
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gnatcatcher to a special ESA section 4(d) rule,31 under which any incidental
harm to the species resulting from developments compatible with an approved
NCCP plan would not be held actionable.32
Some subsequent reports suggest that the Southern California NCCPs
have not worked as well as anticipated, due largely to lack of funding for land
acquisition and monitoring, inadequate oversight, overemphasis on plan development at the expense of science and implementation, and lack of any clear
enforcement mechanism.33 But that is beside the point for our purposes. The
key point here is that in the Southern California case, the mere threat of ESA
listing and legal enforcement of the ESA’s prohibition on “take” or “harm” to a
listed species proved to be the triggering event, setting off a destabilization of
the existing regime of land use and development law. And once that regime
came crashing down, all parties had an interest in genuine collaboration toward
a new bargained-for solution that would allow some development to occur, but
in a manner consistent with species and habitat protection.
My second example comes from Florida. By the latter half of the twentieth century, South Florida’s unique Everglades ecosystem was in sharp decline
as the result of radical reengineering of its hydrology by the Army Corps of
Engineers, aimed at “reclaiming” most of the north half of the Everglades for
agricultural development and buffering the coastal cities of southeast Florida
against the periodic flooding that had historically pounded the area during hurricanes and tropical storms.34 A complex network of drainage canals, pumps,
levees, and surface impoundments had “compartmentalized” the Everglades,
allowing the Corps and a companion state agency, the South Florida Water
Management District, to control and redirect flows throughout the system, and
to channel millions of gallons of “surplus” water out to sea.35 As a consequence, Marjory Stoneman Douglas’s celebrated “river of grass” had been
reduced to a murky trickle, imperiling numerous species of birds and wildlife in
and around Everglades National Park at the south end of the system.36
31

Under section 4(d), the Secretary of the Interior (or Secretary of Commerce in the case of
marine species) is authorized to promulgate “such regulations as he deems necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of” listed threatened species. Endangered Species
Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000). The Fish and Wildlife Service has promulgated a
general section 4(d) rule extending the ESA section 9 prohibition on “take” of endangered
fish and wildlife species to threatened species, unless the Secretary promulgates a special
section 4(d) rule for the species in question. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a), (c) (2005).
32 50 C.F.R. § 17.41 (providing that “[i]ncidental take” of the California gnatcatcher shall
not be considered unlawful if it results from activities allowable under the NCCP Plan); see
also Ebbin, supra note 27, at 696.
33 See DANIEL POLLAK, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE FUTURE OF HABITAT CONSERVATION? THE NCCP EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1-3 (2001).
34 See Mary Doyle & Donald E. Jodrey, Everglades Restoration: Forging New Law in
Allocating Water for the Environment, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 255, 259-61 (2002).
35 Id. at 260.
36 Id. at 260-61 (stating that the natural Everglades ecosystem has been reduced to about
half its original area, and the remaining half has suffered from radical alterations in the
timing, quantity, and quality of freshwater flows, leading to a ninety percent reduction in
wading bird populations and listing of sixty-eight indigenous species as threatened or
endangered).
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Enter a crusading U.S. Attorney, Dexter Lehtinen, who filed suit against
the State of Florida alleging violations of the State’s own laws governing water
quality, largely as a consequence of polluted run-off from large sugar plantations in the Everglades Agricultural Area south of Lake Okeechobee.37
Although the federal Endangered Species Act was not directly at issue in the
case, the federal lawsuit was predicated upon allegations of widespread disruptions of the Everglades ecosystem, implicating endangered species concerns.38
The State fiercely resisted the legal claims until then-Governor Lawton Chiles
made a dramatic appearance in a Miami courthouse and offered to “surrender
his sword,” promising to cooperate with the federal government in developing a
plan to restore water quality and a regime of nature-mimicking water flows to
what was left of the Everglades system.39 Thus was born the first stage of what
would eventually become an $8 billion joint state-federal Everglades restoration effort, seeking to restore seasonal sheet flow to the south Everglades,
reduce polluted runoff by retiring some agricultural lands and constructing a
buffering network of storm water recovery areas where excess nutrients could
be taken up by wetland vegetation, and implement other measures aimed at
restoring water quality and the system’s hydrology.40 Of equal importance in
Florida’s view is that over and above the ecological benefits of Everglades
restoration, the plan is expected to secure a sufficiently large supply of fresh
water to sustain South Florida’s projected population growth well into this century.41 Essentially, the state and federal governments have concluded that the
massive amount of water currently diverted to the sea is an ample source for
both ecological restoration and projected human consumption purposes.
37

See United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 28 F.3d 1563, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1568 (“The [Everglades National] Park provides sanctuary to rare, threatened and
endangered species of wildlife. The Park has diverse and complex ecosystems that require
non-polluted, low nutrient waters for their ecological integrity.”).
39 See Chiles Admits Everglades Polluted, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 21, 1991, at 5B
(“ ‘I’m here with my sword,’ the governor said after the pretrial hearing. ‘I want to give the
sword to someone, I want to surrender.’ ”).
40 See Cynthia A. Drew, Storm Water and the Consent Decree: The Life or Death of the
Everglades, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2007, at 30, 31-32 (describing how the consent decree enabled by Govenor Chiles’ “surrender” led to enactment of state legislation
mandating aggressive new water treatment and stormwater management programs, compliance with water quality standards, and restoration of the historic hydroperiod, setting the
stage for congressional enactment of an ambitious Everglades restoration program predicated
upon a 50/50 federal-state cost sharing arrangement).
41 The federal Everglades restoration law, included in the 2000 Water Resources Development Act, identifies as the “overarching objective” of the Everglades restoration plan the
“restoration, preservation, and protection of the South Florida Ecosystem while providing for
other water-related needs of the region, including water supply and flood protection.” Water
Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572, 2687. The plan
contemplates that recapture of the 1.7 billion gallons of water per day currently diverted to
the sea should provide ample water for both ecosystem restoration and public water supply
needs. See Andrea K. Gerlak & Tanya Heikkila, Comparing Collaborative Mechanisms in
Large-Scale Ecosystem Governance, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657, 665, 670-71 (2006) (stating
that diversion of 1.7 billion gallons per day to the ocean has contributed to saltwater intrusion in the groundwater aquifers supplying water to South Florida’s coastal cities, and restoration of these freshwater flows through the Everglades is expected to secure public water
supplies).
38

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ302.txt

Spring 2008]

unknown

Seq: 9

8-AUG-08

GETTING TO “LET’S TALK”

10:59

819

In this case, it was litigation predicated upon water quality and, indirectly,
endangered species protection norms that operated as the instrument of
destabilization, forcing state and federal agencies to go back to the drawing
boards and rethink the hydrology of South Florida from the ground up. The
parties themselves concluded that a course of cooperation and collaboration
would be more fruitful than continued confrontation, and the ambitious, multiparty, affirmative effort now going into Everglades restoration is very likely
something that never would have occurred had not the destabilizing threat of
litigation been hanging over the State’s head.
Neither the Southern California nor the Everglades case resulted in an
injunction—the remedy contemplated by the Sabel-Simon “destabilization
rights” model. Instead, in Southern California the mere threat of ESA enforcement and costly, protracted litigation was enough to bring the parties to the
table. In the Florida case, litigation was initiated but it resulted in a settlement,
backed by a consent decree countenancing the complex bargaining that ensued.
Note also that in neither case was it citizen-initiated litigation that brought
about the result—in Southern California it was an administrative action, Secretary Babbitt’s decision to list the California gnatcatcher as threatened, and in
Florida it was a suit filed by the U.S. Attorney for South Florida. To that
extent, these cases represent variants on, and extensions of, the Sabel-Simon
model, which we may label “intergovernmental destabilization rights”—in both
cases, rights held by the federal government to destabilize the status quo and
force structural change at the state and local level, exploiting the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause and existing environmental statutes.42
II. NATURAL

AND

ANTHROPOGENIC “DESTABILIZATION EVENTS”

This Part seeks to extend the Sabel-Simon “destabilization rights” model
further, arguing that legal interventions are not the only “destabilization events”
that can trigger the downfall of existing legal and institutional arrangements
and lead to collaboration in the crafting of creative and innovative solutions to
environmental problems.
Perhaps at one level there is nothing new here. It is commonplace in the
environmental law and policy literature to observe that it often takes a crisis or
some kind of dramatic, unsettling event to bring about major changes in environmental law and policy. Thus, the Santa Barbara oil spill was very much on
the minds of the legislators who voted to enact NEPA in 1969.43 CERCLA
was enacted in the wake of the Love Canal incident, when it was discovered
42

Citizen suits arguably would have been available in either case. In the Southern California case, the ESA listing decision was a necessary predicate to any litigation, but once the
species was listed, any citizen meeting standing requirements could have filed suit to enjoin
developments that resulted in “take” or “harm” to the listed species. In South Florida, the
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act might also
have been invoked.
43 See Dan Rothbach, Note, Rigs-to-Reefs: Refocusing the Debate in California, 17 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 283, 285-86 (2007) (stating that the “calamity” of the Santa Barbara
oil spill “had the immediate impact of spurring the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),” its legislative history specifically noting lack of knowledge of
effects on the ocean ecosystem).

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ302.txt

820

unknown

Seq: 10

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

8-AUG-08

10:59

[Vol. 8:811

that an elementary school in Niagara Falls, New York had been built on the site
of a former chemical plant where hundreds of rusting, leaking barrels of chemical wastes were contributing to a toxic soup in the soil and groundwater.44 The
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, including its Toxic
Release Inventory provision, was enacted largely in response to the Bhopal
disaster in India, in which some forty tons of deadly methyl isocyanate gas
leaked from a Union Carbide pesticide factory, killing an estimated 20,000 persons and causing severe illness or injury to another 120,000.45 And so on.
In all the examples cited, however, the disaster triggered a political
response. Gripping coverage in the news media generated a tidal wave of public opinion that political leaders rode to enact new legislation, thus positioning
themselves to claim credit for taking action to address issues that had assumed
high salience with the voting public.
Sometimes, however, natural disasters—storms, earthquakes, tsunamis,
droughts, fires, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and the like—can also trigger
powerful community responses. We have all observed, at least from a distance,
communities pulling together in times of crisis, in extraordinary bursts of civicmindedness, volunteerism, and collaboration. Indeed, it has become a common
theme in the disaster management and prevention literature that this spirit of
community collaboration is all too often an underappreciated and underutilized
but potentially invaluable resource.46 Government agencies, relief organizations, and sympathetic individuals looking at the situation from the outside are
conditioned to think of members of the adversely affected communities as passive, helpless victims, on whose behalf the delivery of externally generated
relief becomes the paramount task. But relief alone cannot heal communities
broken by natural disasters. Communities must ultimately heal themselves by
rebuilding, sometimes from the ground up, and ideally on a more sustainable,
resilient, and less disaster-prone basis. These kinds of community rebuilding
efforts cannot be supplied or directed from the outside, or from the top down.
The initiative must come from local participation, cooperation, and
collaboration.
Nor does the effort need to be confined to restoring the status quo ante.
As the UN Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster

44

See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 691-98 (1999) (describing how the events of Love Canal led to CERCLA’s enactment).
45 See Robert J. Klee, Note, Enabling Environmental Sustainability in the United States:
The Case for a Comprehensive Material Flow Inventory, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 131, 154-56
(2004) (describing the Bhopal incident and its role in EPCRA’s enactment).
46 See, e.g., Loretta Pyles, Community Organizing for Post-Disaster Social Development:
Locating Social Work, 50 INT’L SOC. WORK 321 (2007) (describing the beneficial but often
neglected role of community organizing as a strategy for post-disaster recovery and redevelopment); Rajib Shaw & Katsuihciro Goda, From Disaster to Sustainable Civil Society: The
Kobe Experience, 28 DISASTERS 16 (2004) (describing the role of community self-help in
recovery after the Kobe earthquake in Japan, and urging creation of similar support systems
elsewhere).
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Reduction puts it, “Disasters are opportunities for change and community
development.”47
In short, natural disasters can be a kind of natural “destabilization event”
that not only destroys physical infrastructure but also destabilizes the status quo
in local social and institutional arrangements. In the process, it can clear the
way for new forms of community collaboration and problem-solving to
emerge, and thereby create opportunities for communities to rebuild themselves
on more sustainable lines.48
A similar dynamic may be at work with respect to what I will call here
“anthropo-natural disasters”—disasters that take a physical or “natural” form,
but trace their origins in whole or in part to anthropogenic causes. So, for
example, the forest fires now plaguing much of the American West are partly a
natural phenomenon and take a familiar “natural” form, but they are caused in
part by many decades of misguided fire suppression policies that resulted in the
accumulation of unnaturally high levels of fuel (forest floor litter, downed or
dead trees, understory vegetation, etc.), causing naturally occurring fires to
burn hotter and to spread farther and faster than in a pre-suppression regime.49
In addition, growth of the urban-forest interface has both increased the opportunities for accidental anthropogenic forest fires to get started, and raised the cost
of such fires in property lost or damaged and human lives lost or threatened.50
Finally, to the extent global warming may be contributing to hotter and dryer
summers in the American West, it would represent an additional anthropogenic
cause.51
Other examples of anthropo-natural disasters include desertification of
deforested or overgrazed areas;52 climate change-induced droughts, storms,
floods, and heat waves;53 and, most salient to this discussion, the failure of
river systems to deliver sufficient water due to climate change-induced patterns
of precipitation, temperature, and evaporation, including loss of storage capac47

INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, UNITED NATIONS, LIVING WITH RISK: A
GLOBAL REVIEW OF DISASTER REDUCTION INITIATIVES 178 (2004).
48 Id. at 187 (listing benefits and limitations of community participation in disaster management, as observed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).
49 See Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 308-13 (2006) (describing changing fire policies
in response to new understandings of the effects of prior fire suppression efforts and complexities added by the growing urban-wildlands interface).
50 William G. Bradshaw, Fire Protection at the Urban/Wildland Interface: Who Plays
What Role?, 24 FIRE TECH. 195 (1988).
51 See Donald McKenzie et al., Climatic Change, Wildfire, and Conservation, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 890 (2004) (stating that increased temperature due to climate change is
likely to extend the fire season in the American Southwest and may increase the amplitude
and duration of extreme fire weather).
52 See, e.g., Asma Ali Abahussain et al., Desertification in the Arab Region: Analysis of
Current Status and Trends, 51 J. ARID ENV’TS 521 (2002) (identifying overgrazing, deforestation, and overcultivation as possible causes of desertification).
53 See CTR. FOR HEALTH & THE GLOBAL ENV’T, HARVARD MED. SCH., CLIMATE CHANGE
FUTURES: HEALTH, ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 16-25 (Paul R. Epstein &
Evan Mills eds., 2005) (documenting observed trends toward increased severity and frequency of “extreme weather events” including storms, droughts, flooding, and heat waves,
and citing projections that such trends will intensify as the planet warms).
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ity in the winter snowpack.54 Indeed, we may be approaching a world in which
exclusively “natural” disasters are largely a thing of the past, with the exception
of seismic and volcanic events. So radically are we altering global climate that
perhaps no storm, flood, drought, heat wave, or other hydrologic or temperature
event can be said any longer to be wholly an “act of God” or an act of Nature.
Our hands, too, are now implicated.
If the science of global climate change is right (and I have no reason to
think otherwise), these anthropo-natural destabilization events may become
more frequent, more widespread, and more intense in the years and decades to
come. Some may prove highly disruptive. Some observers warn of the severe
competition and conflict that could ensue, as desperate populations seek to
seize (or retain) control of the resources they need to maintain their standard of
living and way of life in a chaotic, climate-disrupted world.55 These fears may
be overstated, but there is some risk.
But climate-induced anthropo-natural destabilization events may also
represent a moment of “creative destruction,” to borrow a phrase from the
economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter56: a moment when longstanding and long-ossified legal and institutional arrangements over natural
resources are destabilized, opening the door to new, creative, problem-solving
approaches. In short, it may take a train wreck, but the day for collaborative
problem-solving in natural resources management may be fast approaching.
III. LEGAL AND ANTHROPO-NATURAL DESTABILIZATION AND
PROSPECTS FOR COLLABORATION ON THE COLORADO

THE

That brings us to the topic of this conference—the prospects for collaboration on the Colorado River.
I claim no special expertise on the “law of the river,” or on the river’s
hydrology, ecology, chemistry, climate, demographic trends, or any other
social, physical, or biological factor touching upon the river’s management. I
approach this question as a detached observer, from a distance. From that perspective, however, the question is not so much whether we are likely to see
collaboration on the Colorado. The questions are, “When?” and “How much?”
54

See Niklas S. Christensen et al., The Effects of Climate Change on the Hydrology and
Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 337 (2004) (projecting
significant degradation of performance of the Colorado River water resources system relative to historical conditions); Nathan T. VanRheenen et al., Potential Implications of PCM
Climate Change Scenarios for Sacramento-San Joaquin River Basin Hydrology and Water
Resources, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 257 (2004) (projecting significant volumetric and temporal
shifts in water flows under most climate change scenarios).
55 Jon Barnett, Security and Climate Change, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2003).
56 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84-85 (3d ed. 1950)
(describing capitalism as a process of “creative destruction” in which “the new commodity,
the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization” command “a
decisive cost or quality advantage . . . which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the
outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives,” impelling longterm economic growth while producing locally painful dislocations).
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In prior work, I have expressed optimism about the possibilities for collaborative solutions to complex environmental and natural resources problems.57
But here I perhaps depart company a bit from some of the most enthusiastic
among the alternative dispute resolution crowd, who tend to see opportunities
for negotiated “win-win” solutions behind every bush.58 There may indeed be
more of such opportunities than is commonly supposed—but not always.
Especially when the game is perceived by the players to be zero-sum,
some parties will not have an incentive even to begin bargaining, for fear of
losing their present entitlement. In such situations, the challenge is not “Getting to Yes,” in the felicitous phrase of Roger Fisher and William Ury.59
Instead, the challenge lies a stage further back, in simply “Getting to ‘Let’s
Talk.’”
That, in many ways, is the present situation on the Colorado River. We
have here a badly oversubscribed resource.60 With states’ entitlements based
on over-optimistic projections of how much water would be available, made at
a time when we were considering neither the needs of fish and other aquatic
wildlife nor the downstream needs of our international neighbor Mexico, some
parties—“the haves,” or “them that’s got”—have no incentive to engage in
serious bargaining with “the have-nots,” or “them that’s not got.” Even if the
“haves” recognize the present situation is unsustainable, they calculate they are
likely to be better off standing on their rights than opening up zero-sum bargaining over an oversubscribed resource of fixed or diminishing quantity—
bargaining that is likely only to result in a diminution of their existing rights.
Better to accept a shortfall in their legal entitlement than to open a can of
worms that will likely shrink the size of that entitlement. Consequently, we do
not even get to “Let’s Talk,” at least not in a serious way. What discussion
does occur is likely to be pro forma and dilatory, essentially window dressing.
This is where destabilization rights may be invaluable—and where even
anthropo-natural destabilization events may also play a useful role. Something
is needed at this point to destabilize the existing institutional arrangements and
57 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002).
58 See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 139-40 (1985) (stating that in “integrative” bargaining situations in which two or more issues are on the table, “all sides can come out ahead
by trading across issues or items that they value differently—the classic ‘win-win’ situation”). Not all alternative dispute resolution theorists emphasize “win-win” solutions, however. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, for example, avoids the term because she believes that in
many disputes and most legal conflicts it will be impossible for both parties actually to
“win” something; instead, she argues, the goal is to avoid “lose-lose” outcomes as much as
possible. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Foundations of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 31 n.126 (2000).
59 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
60 See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., COMM. ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASES OF COLO. RIVER
BASIN WATER MGMT., COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND
ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007). This assertion is notwithstanding the
recent 2006 letter of agreement between basin states and the Secretary of the Interior on
drought management, a welcome but limited step.
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assignment of entitlements before bargaining and collaboration can even
become a serious possibility.
What might that destabilizing event be? Here I invite you to be creative.
It might be an Endangered Species Act lawsuit that throws a legal monkey
wrench into one or more states’ ability to use their water entitlements. In an
ideal world, it might be an international adjudication of a claim by Mexico,
based on the failure of the U.S. to deliver a sufficient quantity of water, or
water of adequate quality—though in fact, such international adjudications are
extremely rare and generally require the consent of the defendant state. It could
be an administrative action by an aggressive Secretary of the Interior, acting in
the capacity of “river master” with broad discretionary powers over Lower
Basin allocations,61 perhaps ordering drastic cuts in water withdrawals and triggering countering lawsuits by the states in an open legal brawl. It could conceivably be an interstate suit by one or more plaintiff states against one or more
defendant states, alleging a violation of the existing Compact or other applicable sources of law, and throwing the matter back into the lap of a Supreme
Court that has been happy not to be responsible for sorting out the “law of the
river” for a long time now. Any of these eventualities might be enough to
shatter the enforced stability of the legal status quo, set off a Hobbesian allagainst-all scramble, and open the door for cooler heads to argue for negotiations leading to collaborative solutions.
Alternatively, it may not be a legal destabilization but an anthropo-natural
destabilization event that opens the door. I will not hazard a prediction as to
exactly what that event might be—as I said at the outset, I am not an expert on
the relevant science. But just for purposes of a thought experiment, imagine
something like the following scenario:
Several years of drought and record hot temperatures have left the American Southwest parched. In-stream flow in the Colorado River and its tributaries is at the lowest levels ever recorded, as is storage in the region’s reservoirs.
Groundwater aquifers are being drawn down rapidly. Back-to-back recordmild winters result in record-low winter snow accumulations in both the Rockies and the Sierra Nevada, resulting in a sharply reduced spring runoff.
Drawdown of reservoirs has reached a critical stage. California is forced to
curtail deliveries of water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin system to Southern
California, leaving that populous region more dependent than ever on Colorado
River water. California announces that it is unable to meet its timetable for
reducing withdrawals beyond its legal allocation from the Colorado, and in fact
is requesting the Secretary of the Interior to declare a “surplus” to allow it to
increase its withdrawal to meet emergency needs in the Los Angeles basin.
When the Secretary turns down the request, California enacts emergency legislation to curtail water deliveries to Imperial Valley farmers, diverting that water
to Los Angeles. In a replay of the Owens Valley wars, the farmers resort to
self-help, sabotaging California’s Colorado River aqueduct and reopening
61

Construing the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, the Supreme Court held in Arizona
v. California that the Secretary of Interior had broad discretionary authority to determine
state-by-state allocations of Colorado River water and to contract to deliver water to individual users free of the law of prior appropriation. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
580-85 (1963).
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pumps and canal gates to move water through the Imperial Valley’s irrigation
system. Armed vigilante gangs stand sentry to prevent the state police from
rounding up Imperial Valley farmers. A new industry appears overnight—
“water pirates” who converge on unprotected water supplies and siphon the
water into stolen tanker trucks, to be sold to the highest bidder on the black
market. Hijackings of legal tanker trucks delivering emergency water supplies
to desperate communities are rampant. Conditions are no better in other states.
In Nevada, the Las Vegas metro region is desperate as groundwater sources
continue to dwindle. Backs against the wall, Nevada officials begin to
purchase water from black market suppliers, further fueling a Roaring Twenties-style wide open flouting of a legal regime that has become effectively
unenforceable. Seeing the huge profits to be made, organized crime moves to
take over the illegal market. Chaos ensues.
In this nightmare scenario, legal “rights” are destabilized not by court
action but by a combination of natural forces (extreme drought and climate
disruption) traceable in part to anthropogenic causes (greenhouse gas emissions), together with extreme, extra-legal self-help measures borne either of
desperation or of opportunism in the face of the collapsing legal regime.
Let us hope it never comes to this. But in this or in some other, less
extreme form, anthropo-natural destabilization events could lead to a breakdown of the existing system of entrenched legal entitlements. What follows is
up for grabs, but the potential exists in such a moment of destabilization for the
principals to come together to attempt to forge a new set of institutional
arrangements and a new assignment of entitlements—a creative, collaborative,
“constitutive moment,” to borrow and adapt a concept from Bruce Ackerman’s
constitutional theory.62 In short, failure of the existing legal regime to cope
with extreme anthropo-natural stresses may be enough to force even the most
entrenched parties to rethink their position and seek a new round of cooperation
and collaboration to restore order to the broken system.
Even short of this extreme nightmare scenario, however, anthropo-natural
destabilization events of lesser severity can often be contributing, or even triggering, causes of legal destabilization. Let us revisit for a moment our earlier
examples of legal destabilization rights in environmental contexts, which were
described at the outset as a purely legal matter. Consider again the Mono Lake
case.63 Surely it was an anthropo-natural eventuality—the dramatic shrinkage
of Mono Lake and the ecological crisis that ensued, all as a consequence of Los
Angeles’s water withdrawals on Mono Lake’s freshwater tributaries—that triggered the decision by the National Audubon Society and other parties to seek
legal destabilization by filing a public trust doctrine lawsuit, aimed at destabilizing Los Angeles’s apparently well entrenched appropriative water rights.
Similarly, in the Everglades case64 it was a gradually unfolding but severe
62 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 23-75 (1998) (advancing
the theory that constitutional change can occur either through the formal mechanism of Article V amendment, or through an episodic mobilization of the citizenry in a transformative
constitutional politics that alters constitutional understandings through informal and unconventional means).
63 See supra notes 8, 19, 21-24 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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anthropo-natural event—drastic reductions in populations of endemic species
and degradation of their habitats in the South Everglades, all as a consequence
of Florida’s benighted water management policies—that prompted the U.S.
Attorney to seek a legal destabilization of the entrenched water management
regime by filing a lawsuit. In both cases, the legal destabilization succeeded in
part because of the severity and salience of the environmental crisis, and in part
because the court (in the Mono Lake case) or the defendant itself (in the Everglades case) recognized that simply allowing entrenched institutional arrangements to stand was simply untenable in the face of such severe environmental
harm.
Perhaps a more complete story, then, is that in environmental and natural
resource management contexts, entrenched institutional arrangements and
assignments of legal entitlements generally have the upper hand, and in situations in which the game is perceived to be zero-sum, the “haves” are unlikely to
cooperate in reconsidering those institutional arrangements and entitlements.
But severe anthropo-natural destabilizations may force reconsideration. In
many cases, however, it may require the instrumentality of legal action—a lawsuit leading to a court judgment (as in the Mono Lake case) or a settlement
under the shadow of a threatened court judgment (as in the Everglades case)—
to bring the anthropo-natural destabilization issues to a head and force the legal
destabilization to occur. And once such a legal destabilization does occur, it
clears away the entrenched bargaining positions of the status quo ante, shifts
the parties’ incentives to cooperate, and opens the door to fresh reconsideration,
from the ground up, of the appropriate institutional arrangements and the nature
and scope of subsequent entitlements.
Now let me introduce one final variant on the model. Understanding just
how disruptive both anthropo-natural destabilizations and legal destabilizations
can be, and how costly they are likely to be in needless transaction costs, parties blessed with cool heads and foresight may sometimes short-circuit this process and achieve the same endpoint through prophylactic action. That, I
submit, is a fair characterization of the Southern California Endangered Species
Act/NCCP negotiation, the third example of environmental “destabilization
rights” presented at the outset of this Paper.65 Recall that in Southern California we had already witnessed a partial anthropo-natural destabilization—loss
and degradation of a large fraction of the California coastal sage scrub habitat.
But it was only a partial loss: good habitat remained, in sufficient quantities
and of a sufficiently high quality that no species endemic to the area had, in
fact, been listed as endangered or threatened. But the handwriting was on the
wall. Secretary Babbitt rolled the dice and listed the California gnatcatcher as
threatened, in part because the underlying science justified that determination,
but partly in anticipation that unless drastic action were taken soon, more
habitat would be lost, and more endemic species would become threatened or
endangered. Consequently, a legal destabilization was needed, and an Endangered Species Act listing decision gave the Secretary the tools he needed to
force one. But the critical action here was (uncharacteristically for the Endangered Species Act) prophylactic, not reactive—the goal was to stanch the loss
65

See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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of habitat and prevent even more serious environmental harm than had already
occurred.
For their part, landowners, developers, and state and local officials were
also clear-eyed and cool-headed in response. They might resist the Secretary’s
listing decision on judicial review or resist ESA enforcement actions on a caseby-case basis if the listing determination stood. But that looked like a losing
strategy: the transaction costs would be high, and the legal odds were probably
not in their favor. So rather than letting the matter be adjudicated by the courts,
or even letting the matter proceed to ESA enforcement, they elected to retreat
from their heretofore entrenched institutional arrangements and legal entitlements, and accept that a legal destabilization had already occurred de facto.
From that point forward, the goal was to strike the best deal they could, collaborating with the federal government to develop legally enforceable Natural
Communities Conservation Plans and to incorporate those plans into local land
use plans. That two-step process would allow development to proceed in San
Diego, Orange, and Riverside Counties, but only to the extent and in a place
and manner compatible with conservation of a substantial and sustainable
reserve of coastal sage scrub habitat, sufficient to protect not only the California gnatcatcher but also other endemic species that had never been listed under
the ESA. This, then, was a forward looking, prophylactic action all around,
made necessary by the threat of severe anthropo-natural destabilization, and
made possible by the all-too-real threat of legal destabilization.
That, finally, brings us back to the Colorado River. If I am right that a
new round of collaboration is needed on the Colorado to redesign its institutions and assignment of entitlements from the ground up, it seems to me there
are four ways it might happen.
First, we might simply appeal to the good will of the parties, suggesting
that the present system is unsustainable and that as rational actors they should
simply set aside their existing entitlements and reopen everything for reconsideration. For reasons I have stated, that course seems unlikely, mainly because
the “haves,” those currently holding the greatest legal entitlements, will perceive they have too much to lose.
Second, we might simply wait and do nothing until a severe anthroponatural destabilization, perhaps resembling the nightmare scenario described
above, intervenes to force the parties to the bargaining table in an effort to build
a new, workable system to replace the one that has been broken. That course
seems dangerous. Destabilization costs may be exceedingly high, and it may
be extremely difficult to retrieve order out of such extreme chaos.
Third—and perhaps it will come to this—we might wait not quite so long,
until a serious but not catastrophic level of anthropo-natural destabilization has
set in, just enough to trigger an Endangered Species Act lawsuit, or a suit by
one or more states against one or more others, or an administrative action by an
impatient Secretary of the Interior that is so disruptive it shatters the status quo.
Any of these, given the right set of circumstances, might be enough to set off a
controlled legal destabilization that disentrenches established institutional
arrangements and entitlements, and opens the door to new collaboration and
cooperative reconstruction of our regime for managing the Colorado River. We
might not need to wait very long; the day may be close at hand.
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Fourth, and finally, perhaps cooler heads and foresight will prevail. Anticipating the possibility of either extreme anthropo-natural destabilization, or
legal destabilization triggered by some less extreme but nonetheless serious
anthropo-natural destabilization, the parties might come to see that the wiser
course here, as in the Southern California case, is to avoid destabilization costs
and transaction costs, and voluntarily (albeit under threat) agree to set aside
their entrenched rights and bargain in good faith toward new institutional
arrangements and collaborative solutions. This is the preferred outcome, but it
depends upon the parties having the necessary wisdom and foresight—always a
lot to hope for. It also depends upon the degree to which the threats of
anthropo-natural and legal destabilization might be made to appear substantial,
plausible, and likely.
Now skeptics might suggest that scenario number four comes round more
or less full circle to scenario number one: bargaining triggered by the good will
of the parties, which we initially rejected as unlikely. I want to resist this suggestion, however. There is a difference. Again, the Southern California experience is instructive. The State of California originally enacted its Natural
Communities Conservation Planning Act to provide for purely voluntary collaborative conservation planning among landowners, developers, state and local
government agencies, conservationists, and others, hoping to obviate the need
for additional ESA listings by putting in place regional conservation plans that
would protect the habitats of species not yet eligible for listing.66 By most
accounts, however, the voluntary phase of the NCCP program was not very
successful,67 for predictable reasons: parties with entrenched legal rights had
inadequate incentives to surrender any part of those rights voluntarily. It took
the decision to list the California gnatcatcher under the ESA, triggering potentially legally enforceable obligations that threatened to destabilize existing entitlements, to inject the sense of urgency that drove the collaborative process and
led to development and implementation of substantial and meaningful conservation plans. This illustrates, I think, the crucial difference between bargaining
simply on the basis of an appeal to good will, on the one hand, and bargaining
under the threat of destabilization on the other.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have persuaded you that the “destabilization rights” concept
developed by Sabel and Simon is transferable to the environmental and natural
resources law and policy context, where both legal and natural or “anthroponatural” destabilizations, as well as the mere threat of such destabilizations,
may operate as a powerful spur to bargaining and creative, collaborative reconstitution of institutional frameworks and reassignments of legal entitlements. Such a “re-constitutive moment” is, I believe, long overdue in the context of Colorado River management. I am of the opinion that sooner or later it
will happen, precisely because the risk of an anthropo-natural destabilization of
extreme magnitude is so great. This threat is likely either to trigger a destabi66
67

See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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lizing legal intervention before the anthropo-natural destabilization reaches its
full magnitude or, in the most optimistic scenario, to trigger a voluntary reconsideration of entrenched legal entitlements even before a full-scale legal intervention is undertaken. Either way, the day for reconstituting institutional
arrangements and legal entitlements on the Colorado along broadly collaborative lines is fairly near at hand. The question that remains is just how much we
will need to absorb in dislocation costs and transaction costs before that day
arrives.

